A Litmus Test on Terrorism

Just below the radar screen, an important date is fast approaching.

From November 5 to 8, representatives of the 186-member-nation INTERPOL, the Lyon-based international police organization, will gather in Marrakech, Morocco, for their annual General Assembly. Normally, the event doesn’t make headlines, but this time could be different.

The story begins in July 1994. The building of the AMIA, the central welfare body of Argentine Jewry, was reduced to rubble in a terrorist attack. Eighty-five people were killed; many more were injured. (Two years earlier, another terrorist attack in Buenos Aires had targeted the Israeli embassy, killing twenty-nine people.)

In the ensuing years, despite lofty pronouncements by successive Argentine governments about the need to pursue justice, as well as some promising leads, the case essentially went nowhere. Things began to change, however, in 2003, when President Nestor Kirchner took office. He pledged to leave no stone unturned in pursuing the culprits.

His pronouncements, reminiscent of those of his predecessors, were initially met with skepticism by those convinced that Argentina didn’t have the political will to see the case through. But they were proved wrong.

President Kirchner was a man of his word. He appointed a special prosecutor, Alberto Nisman, and gave him the running room to build a first-class team and follow the leads wherever they might go. Nisman, to his credit, did just that.

By the fall of 2006, Nisman confirmed what many had suspected all along. There was a direct line from the AMIA bombing to the Middle East. The masterminds of the terrorist attack were from the upper echelons of the Iranian government, joined by at least one well-known Hezbollah operative. He pointed the finger at eight Iranians, including a former president, a foreign minister, and a former Iranian ambassador to Argentina. (The Hezbollah leader, Imad Fayez Mughniyah, was already being sought by other countries for his involvement in numerous terrorist assaults.)

Nisman submitted his heavily documented findings to the presiding judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, who added his stamp of approval. The nine now stood formally accused by Argentina of “crimes against humanity.”

The next step was to submit the evidence to INTERPOL in order to have international arrest notices requested for the nine.

In March 2007, following a recommendation by INTERPOL’s Office of Legal Affairs, the thirteen-member Executive Committee, elected by the General Assembly, met to review the Argentine request.

Nisman traveled to Lyon for the discussion, where he made a presentation and responded to questions. Iran, opposed to the request, sent an Iranian-born British lawyer to present its position. The Executive Committee voted to issue ”Red Notices” (nonbinding advisories that circulate a national arrest warrant to all INTERPOL member countries) for six of the nine named by Argentina.

“The Executive Committee carefully considered all the information put before it, and in light of INTERPOL’s rules believes that the conclusions of the Office of Legal Affairs that these six Red Notices should be issued is correct,” said INTERPOL President Jackie Selebi, of South Africa, in a March 15 press release.

The three other Iranians—Ali Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Velayati, and Hadi Soleimanpour—were deemed ineligible by dint of their political positions, not because they were necessarily considered unconnected to the attack.

The story, though, didn’t end there. Iran challenged the decision. Under INTERPOL’s Article 24, the matter had to be referred to the General Assembly. Leaving nothing to chance, Iran launched a diplomatic offensive.

According to INTERPOL rules, such decisions at the General Assembly are determined by a simply majority. Each country has one vote.

Iran has few natural allies in the world today, so it has reached out, in particular, to developing countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Many of these countries themselves have experienced terrorist attacks and, therefore, aren’t particularly sympathetic to Tehran’s appeals. Consequently, Iran has resorted, we’ve been told, to the tried and tested international diplomatic tools of what can only be described as bribery and blackmail.

Awash with oil revenue, given the soaring price of oil today, Iran can spread its largesse rather generously. Conversely, it can threaten, arm-twist, withhold, and cajole when faced with reluctant interlocutors.

Of course, what Tehran would dearly love is to portray this as a battle against the “satanic” United States or the “Zionist conspiracy,” which, it feels, would automatically evoke greater sympathy and support.

Indeed, after Argentine President Kirchner, in his UN General Assembly address last month, called for Iran’s cooperation and global support at INTERPOL’s General Assembly meeting, an Iranian foreign ministry spokesman accused the Argentine leader of being “under the pressure of the Zionists.”

But there’s just one problem: This story doesn’t sell.

Iran’s principal adversary – the one that has been doggedly pursuing it – is Argentina, itself a developing country. And President Kirchner, as anyone who has been following his administration these past several years knows, is a fiercely independent individual. He’s in no one’s pocket. His nation’s foreign policy can’t be easily pigeonholed. And, though Iranian leaders may have trouble grasping the concept, Argentina’s judiciary today is not beholden to any government.

No doubt, the United States would like to see the Argentine position prevail in Marrakech. So would Israel. And so should any nation that understands the scourge of terrorism, Iran’s hyperactive role as a state sponsor of terrorism, and the need to stand firm and united against those who cross borders to target innocent civilians for death.

Thus, while Iran seeks to politicize the case, for Argentina it’s not about politics, but justice – justice delayed, to be sure, but justice nonetheless.

And so, as the General Assembly meeting rapidly approaches, the stakes are high. Recent reports suggest that Iran may seek a delay in the vote. If so, it would indicate that Iran hasn’t managed to garner a majority in support of its position. But, of course, lots can happen in the run-up to the meeting, which is why there’s no room for complacency.

An Argentine victory in Marrakech won’t necessarily lead to arrests anytime soon, but will send a powerful message to the world: Even if it takes thirteen years, involves missteps, cover-ups, and false starts, consumes countless man hours, and runs diplomatic risks, Argentina will not let go. The nation was attacked in 1994, its citizens were killed and maimed, and it demands justice.

Argentina deserves full support. Its example should be followed by other nations that have felt the long and deadly hand of international terrorism. And the eyes of the world ought to be on Marrakech to see not only what the final outcome is, but also to know, country by country, who stands where on this crucial vote.

David A. Harris is the executive director of the American Jewish Committee.